In contrast to some trade theorists' long-held beliefs, this study shows that free trade reduces the welfare of a small country with unemployment unless the free trade price of the importable falls below the autarky equivalent price. This study formulates a disequilibrium trade model with sticky money wages that has been generalized to fixed-price economies where output prices as well as wages are fixed, independent of excess demand or supply in the labor and goods markets. After describing the model and its solution, the authors discuss the implications of changing tariff rates on foreign products, construct a numerical example showing that their result is possible for many countries with unemployment, and analyze the issues of optimal tariff. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The usual caveats apply.
Introduction
Trade theorists have long believed that free trade necessarily improves the welfare of a small country. In a brilliant paper Kemp (1968, p. 158) suggested the possibility of a paradox that an improvement in the terms of trade results in a welfare loss. 1 Johnson (1965) further argued that with factor price rigidity free trade may actually reduce the welfare of a small open economy, a special case of the Kemp paradox. Batra and Pattanaik (1970) , however, demonstrate that even in the presence of factor price rigidity and factor immobility, free trade still dominates autarky because "production gain" is zero but "consumption gain"
is positive, and further suggest that the possibility of a negative optimal tariff cannot be ruled out a priori.
The possibility of welfare reducing trade has since been largely discounted and treated only as a theoretical curiosity. Due to a growing recognition that foreign imports are the cause of high unemployment, however, the protectionist mood has been spreading in the United States. The literature has also begun to investigate the link between unemployment and trade. Specifically, Batra and Beladi (1990) investigated the impacts of unemployment on the pattern of trade, citing widespread unemployment even in developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States in the 1930s as well as in the 1980s. In many countries the minimum wage is considered to be set by institutional arrangements such as unions or minimum wage legislations. Chao and Yu (1990) showed that an improvement in the terms of trade need not raise welfare of an economy suffering from urban unemployment.
If imports of less expensive foreign goods are to raise domestic unemployment, some trade restrictions might prove beneficial. Batra (1992) also suggested that a movement towards freer trade in America led to productivity slowdown and lower real wages since 1972, and hence for the vast majority of people whose main income comes from labor earnings, freer trade generated increased poverty in the United States.
This paper formulates a disequilibrium trade model with sticky money wages that has been generalized to fix-price economies where output prices as well as wages are fixed, independent of excess demand or supply in the labor and goods markets. This paper differs from existing literature in two important respects. First, unlike the models that only suggest the possibility of welfare reducing trade, this paper demonstrates that a decline in the price of the importable from the autarky level caused by free trade will necessarily reduce the welfare of a small country with unemployment. With unemployment, the economy can enjoy consumption gain from free trade, but production gain may become negative so that it outweighs any consumption gain. That is, the Kemp paradox necessarily occurs in the neighborhood of autarky. To demonstrate this result, we assume à la Batra and Beladi (1990) and Yu (1982) that only wage is rigid, permitting interest rate flexibility.
Second, we construct a numerical example to illustrate that even if the free trade price of the importable falls substantially below the autarky level, a small country with unemployment may not recover from the negative welfare shock from the increase in unemployment. It is noteworthy that the amount of labor employed changes with the relative commodity price as a result of inequality between the marginal rate of transformation in production and the relative commodity price. As the price of the importable declines, welfare begins to improve beyond a certain point. When the price of the importable falls to the autarky equivalent price, the positive terms of trade effect exactly offsets the negative welfare effect of increased unemployment. Hence, this paper attempts to formally identify situations where tariff serves as an employment-protecting device. A numerical example illustrates a case where free trade does not improve welfare until the price of the importable declines to 50 percent of the autarky level. We also examine in this case whether autarky should be maintained, or a nonprohibitive import tariff should be used to offset the adverse welfare effect of opening trade.
After describing the model and its solution, we discuss the implications of changing tariff rates on the foreign products. We then construct a numerical example to show that our result is a possibility for many countries with unemployment, then analyze the issues of optimal tariff. We conclude with some general remarks.
Fixed Money Wage and Welfare Reducing Trade
A small open economy with unemployed resources operates inside its production possibility frontier. Unemployment arises from imperfections in the factor markets.
Harberler (1950), Johnson (1965) , and Jones and Norman (1979) To lay the basis for analyzing the welfare effects of free trade for a small country with money wage rigidity, 2 we adapt Batra and Beladi (1990) and Jones and Norman (1979) with the following assumptions:
(i) The domestic economy consists of N identical consumers.
(ii) Two factors, capital K and labor L, are used to produce two goods, the exportable z and the importable y.
(iii) The exportable is the numeraire, and the domestic price q and the foreign price q* of the exportable are equal to unity. The economy is small and the foreign price of the importable p* is exogenous.
(iv) In the short run the domestic wage w is rigid and does not respond to random changes in the domestic and foreign prices. Capital is fully employed, and mobile between sectors. The interest rate r is flexible and responds to price changes.
(v) Perfect competition prevails in product markets and the capital market.
Let Z and Y denote the domestic production of the exportable z and the importable y.
Outputs of the traded goods are given by
and the production functions F(@) and G(@) are assumed to be concave in inputs, where L i and K i denote labor and capital employed in sector i, i = z,y. 3 Producers in the export sector choose L z and K z to maximize profits,
The first-order conditions are:
where q = q* = 1, and the subscripts denote partial derivatives. Similarly, producers in the import sector choose L y and K y to maximize profits,
It is important to note that an increase in the price of one product does not directly affect factor demands in the other sector. However, an increase in the price of the importable affects the demand for capital in that sector and increases the interest rate. Thus, an increase in the price of the importable affects labor demand in the export sector indirectly via a change in interest rate. The input demand functions can be written
Consumer preferences are represented by a monotone increasing utility function, U = U(C,X), where C denotes domestic consumption of the exportable and X denotes domestic consumption of the importable. The budget constraint of the consumer is C + pX = I, where I is income in terms of the numeraire good. The first-order condition is: UX/UC = p. Let C = C(p,I) and X = X(p,I) denote the demand functions for C and X. Then the indirect utility function is written
To reduce domestic unemployment the government restricts trade by imposing a tariff t = p ! p* on imports. The import demand function is
which implies QI = XI. The government revenue from trade taxes is
Following the convention, the tariff revenue is rebated to consumers.
The aggregate profit, B = B z + B y , is returned to consumers as dividends. In addition to profit dividend, B, and tariff rebate, (p -p*)Q, consumers also receive income from the sale of factor services. The consumer receives w(L z + L y ) + r(K z + K y ) from the factor markets.
Hence, consumer income is
Unemployment and Foreign Price of the Importable
How does free trade affect the welfare of a small country with unemployed resources?
To put it differently, if a small country adopts a free trade policy (p = p*), how does a change in the foreign price of the importable affect unemployment? Free trade necessarily results in a decrease in the price of the importable below the autarky level, at least in the two-good
world. An increase (decrease) in the price of the importable encourages (discourages) domestic production of the importable. If the economy is operating along the production possibility frontier, the expanding import sector must attract resources from the other sector, and hence an increase in the foreign price of the importable necessarily reduces the domestic supply of the exportable.
If both factors are not fully employed, increased production of the importable can be obtained by utilizing unemployed resources without contracting the export sector. However, when labor is unemployed and capital is fully employed, a change in the price of the importable affects the production of the exportable indirectly via a change in the interest rate.
We first focus on the direct effect. For a given interest rate, an improvement in the terms of trade caused by a decline in p* does not affect employment or production in the export sector; i.e.,
However, we show that a decline in the import price reduces employment of normal factors in the import sector. From the first-order conditions in (2N), 
Unemployment and Welfare Reducing Trade
Observe that an indirect utility, V(p*,Z + p*Y), is inversely related to p* but positively related with national income, Z + p*Y. Thus, a decline in the price of the importable affects welfare in two opposite directions; the terms of trade effect on welfare is positive, but the income effect is negative. We show that unless the price of the importable falls below the autarky equivalent price the negative income effect dominates the terms of trade effect.
Consider how national welfare is affected by a fall in the foreign price of the importable.
If p = p*, the expression for national income in (5) reduces to I = Z + p*Y. Recall from (1N) that an increase in the price the importable does not directly affect the output of the export sector, but indirectly via a change in the interest rate.
How does an increase in r affect the factor demands and output in the export sector?
Differentiating (1N) yields Equilibrium in the domestic capital market is given by
Equation (9) defines how the equilibrium interest rate r(p) responds to a change in p.
Differentiating (9) with respect to p gives dr/dp = -(
Recall from (7b) that MK y /Mp > 0 if K is a normal input. Thus, if K is a normal input, an increase in the price of the importable increases demand for capital and raises the interest rate, dr/dp > 0. Observe that dI/dp* = Y + p*(dY/dp*) + dZ/dp* = Y + w(dL y /dp*) + r(dK y /dp*) + w(dL z /dp*) + r(dK z /dp*) = Y + w(dL/dp*),
where L = L z + L y is aggregate demand, L < !L, and dK y /dp* + dK z /dp* = 0 since capital is fully employed.
An increase in p not only affects the labor demand in the import sector for a given interest rate (direct effect), but also affects it indirectly by raising the interest rate. Thus, the total effects on labor demands can be written dL z /dp = (ML z /Mr)(dr/dp), dL y /dp = (ML y /Mp) + (ML y /Mr)(dr/dp).
From (8a), ML z /Mr < (>) 0 if K and L are complements (substitutes) in the production of Z.
Similarly, ML y /Mr < (>) 0 if K and L are complements (substitutes) in the production of Y.
Thus, if K and L are complements (substitutes), the indirect effects, (ML i /Mr)(dr/dp), are negative (positive), i = y,z. If K and L are substitutes, then dL i /dp > 0, but the sign of dL/dp* = (ML z /Mr)(dr/dp) + (ML y /Mr)(dr/dp) + (ML y /Mp) is indeterminate if K and L are complements.
However, the direct effects are likely to more than offset the indirect effects. Hereafter, we assume that an increase in the price of the importable increases aggregate demand for labor, dL/dp* > 0.
Differentiating V(p*,Z + p*Y) with respect to p* and using Roy's identity, Vp = -VIX,
and (11) gives dV/dp* = VI[-Q + w(dL/dp*)],
which is generally indeterminate. When evaluated at the autarky price p A , Q = 0, and hence dV/dp* = VI@w(dL/dp*)> 0. That is, the initial welfare impact of opening up trade depends on the employment effect.
Proposition I:
Assume that money wage is fixed and interest rate is flexible. If dL/dp* > 0, then a decline in the price of the importable from the autarky level initially reduces welfare of a small country.
Observe that if labor is fully employed, dL/dp* = d!L/dp* = 0 in (12), and dV/dp* = -VIQ. In this case, Q > (<) 0 and dV/dp* < (>) 0 for p < (>) p*. Thus, indirect utility is minimized at the autarky price. However, when labor is unemployed, a minimum of indirect utility occurs at a price somewhere below the autarky price, p A .
A Numerical Example
We That is, each sector produces one-half of national income in autarky. Differentiating V with respect to p* gives dV/dp* = [p*Y -Z + 2p*(dZ/dp*) + 2p* 2 (dY/dp*)](I/4p* 2 ).
Evaluating dV/dp* at p A and utilizing
gives dV/dp*?p A = [dZ/dp* + p A (dY/dp*)]Y > 0.
That is, if free trade results in a small decrease in the price of the importable from the autarky level, opening up trade reduces welfare. For a large price change, however, the terms of trade effect may dominate the output effect.
The example further illustrates that the range of the price interval in which free trade is welfare reducing can be relatively wide. Recall that an increase in the price of the importable p* increases demand for capital in the import sector and raises the interest rate, which in turn raises production cost and reduces production in the export sector; i.e., dZ/dp* < 0.
To capture the indirect effect of a decrease in p* on the production of the exportable Recall from (11) that w(dL/dp*) = dZ/dp* + p*(dY/dp*) = -(1/3) + p*, which is positive when p* = p A = 1, and hence a decrease in p* below p A increases labor unemployment. Differentiating I and V with respect to p* gives dI/dp* = Y + (dZ/dp*) + p*(dY/dp*) = -(1/3) + 2p*.
dV/dp* = VI@[-Q + (dZ/dp*) + p*(dY/dp*)].
When evaluated at p A = 1, Q = 0, dI/dp* = 5/3 and dV/dp* = ( . Note that since U(@) is an ordinal utility function, a monotone increasing transformation of the direct utility U or the indirect utility V has no effect on the level of p B .
Optimal Tariff
Since the economy operates inside the production possibility curve in the short run, imports of "cheap" foreign goods increases domestic unemployment and may adversely affect national welfare. Thus, free trade may not be optimal and a small country with unemployment may use trade restrictions to lessen the adverse employment and welfare effects of imports. 4 To correct domestic market distortions, Johnson (1965, p. 8) recommended "the simplest remedy, a tax or subsidy, imposed at the point where the distortion occurs."
Although the optimal production subsidy is theoretically superior to the optimal tariff to cope with unemployment, trade restrictions have been more popular politically. 5 A commonly cited reason for avoiding a production subsidy is that the subsidy must be appropriated annually. Since annual appropriations must be reviewed periodically and the outcome may be uncertain, producers have favored trade restrictions. Once instituted, protection tends to become automatic and irreversible.
For these reasons, we consider optimal trade restriction. Brecher (1974) earlier argued that a tariff may improve the welfare of a small country with labor unemployment. In contrast, Batra and Seth (1977) suggested the paradoxical possibility that the optimal tariff may be negative. We now investigate the properties of optimal tariff and show that restricted trade with a positive optimal tariff dominates free trade. The policymaker is assumed to employ only a tariff to offset the adverse welfare impacts of unemployment resulting from a decline in the foreign price. The policymaker's problem is to choose the domestic price p (/ p* + t) to maximize the indirect utility
The first-order condition is: dJ/dp / VI[(dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) + (p -p*)(dQ/dp)] = 0, or (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) + t(dQ/dp) = 0.
From (11), dZ/dp + p(dY/dp) = w(dL/dp), and hence the optimal tariff is given by t e = -w(dL/dp)/(dQ/dp).
Note that if the wage rate is flexible and labor is fully employed, producers jointly maximize revenue R = Z + pY, and hence, (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) = dL/dp = 0. In this case t = 0; i.e., the optimal tariff for a small full employment economy is zero. However, if labor is not fully employed, then dL/dp > and the optimal tariff is positive for a small country operating inside its production possibility frontier. 6 If the country uses a sufficiently high tariff it can achieve full employment. But is the full employment tariff optimal for a small country with labor unemployment? Let t f > 0 be the full employment tariff and p f = p* + t f now be the domestic price that induces full employment. Then at p f , producer revenue R = Z + pY is maximized, (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) = 0, and hence dJ/dp is negative. Thus, the full employment tariff is higher than the optimal tariff (t f > t e ). Recall from (16N) that the necessary condition for the optimal tariff t e to be positive is that w(dL/dp) = (dZ/dp) + p(dY/dp) > 0. This implies that there is some unemployment at the optimal tariff.
If the optimal tariff is used, does restricted trade improve welfare and dominate autarky?
A change in p* affects welfare directly and also indirectly through the adjustment of the optimal tariff. The objective function is written as
Note that dJ/dp* = (MJ/Mp*) + (MJ/Mp)(dp/dp*) and that MJ/Mp = 0 by (16N). Differentiating (18) with respect to p* and using the envelope theorem yields
where MQ/Mp* measures the effect of a change in p* on import demand, holding p constant.
From (3), if the importable is a normal good (XI > 0), then MQ/Mp* = XI(MI/Mp*).
Differentiating I = Z + pY + (p -p*)Q with respect to p*, holding p constant, yields
If XI > 0, then MQ/Mp* = -XIQ/(1 -tXI) < 0, and it must be distinguished from dQ/dp* = MQ/Mp* + (MQ/Mp)(dp/dp*), which measures the effect of an increase in p* on import while allowing the optimal tariff t and domestic price p to adjust. At the autarky price utility is roughly U-shaped and reaches a minimum at autarky when the optimal tariff is employed. That is, optimally restricted trade yields higher welfare than autarky.
Proposition II: Assume that the money wage is fixed and the interest rate is flexible in a small country. Then (i) the optimal tariff t e is less than the full employment tariff t f , and hence does not eliminate unemployment, and
(ii) if the importable is a normal good, restricted trade with an optimal tariff improves welfare.
It is important to note that an optimal tariff is also less than a full employment tariff in Choi and Beladi (1993) where the interest rate is fixed. Part (ii) of this proposition is more general in that interest rate is flexible and there is no price uncertainty. The main crux of our argument in Proposition II is the assurance that with unemployment, restricted trade with optimal tariff will always be welfare-improving.
Concluding Remarks
The possibility of welfare-reducing trade has been treated only as a theoretical rarity in the literature and has not been seriously examined. This paper demonstrates that free trade initially reduces welfare of a small open economy with unemployed resources; i.e., the Kemp paradox necessarily occurs in the neighborhood of autarky. This is because opening up trade initially increases domestic unemployment when money wage is rigid. In other words, this paper highlights the existence of a trade-off between the terms of trade gain from reducing the domestic price of imports and the loss in welfare due to the decrease in domestic production of the importable good that eventually leads to a higher unemployment level.
In the numerical example the output shares of the export and import sectors are equal in autarky, and the price of the importable must fall more than 50 percent from the autarky level before the trading country becomes as well off as under autarky. Examples with different output shares can easily be constructed where the export share is rising. If the optimal tariff is employed, restricted trade improves welfare and hence autarky is not an optimal policy.
These findings suggest that trade policy may be warranted to offset the negative impact of trade when labor is unemployed. 
